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A COMPENSATION AWARD FOR PERSONAL INJURY
OR WRONGFUL DEATH IS TAX-EXEMPT:
SHOULD WE TELL THE JURY?
ROBERT EMMETT BURNS *
What is't to us if taxes rise or fall?
Thanks to our Fortune, we pay none at alt
N THE United States, by statute, damage awards for personal injury
or wrongful death are not includable in the gross income of the
recipient. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in section 104(a)
(2), specifically exempts from gross income the "amount of any dam-
ages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal
injuries or sickness."'
The exemption embraces loss of earnings2 and includes recoveries
obtained in wrongful death actions.' Apparently, the intent of Con-
gress was to treat personal injury or wrongful death awards as restora-
tions of lost capital.4 The passage of section 104 of the Code did not,
however, disentangle the income tax from the personal injury verdict.
In an ordinary personal injury suit plaintiff can recover compensation
for the value of his lost past earnings and the value of his impaired
"future earning capacity." 5 In a wrongful death action the survivor
or statutory representative (depending on the jurisdiction) is entitled
to recover the present value of prospective earnings that decedent
might have earned but for his death (loss of estate) and in some juris-
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104(a) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1956).
2 McWeeney v. New York N.H. & A.R. Co., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied
364 U.S. 870 (1960).
3 Anderson v. United Air Lines, 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Rev. Rul. 19,
1954-1 CuM. BULL. 179.
4 31 Ops. A'rr'y GEN. 304, 308 (1918); Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th
Cir. 1962); cf. Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1495 (1956).
r Cf. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES S 1 (1935); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 924 (1939).
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dictions the present value of the estate that decedent might have ac-
cumulated and eventually might have left to his widow or representa-
tive had he not died prematurely (loss to estate)." The common
denominator of actions for personal injury and for wrongful death is
the amount that the plaintiff may receive, in large measure represents
earnings7 or income that would have involved income tax consequences
had plaintiff not been injured or killed.
It was quite natural, therefore, to expect defense counsels to make
attempts to inject the issue of income tax saving on direct examination
with the introduction of evidence, on cross examination, in final argu-
ment, in proffered instructions, and by means of various combinations
of these to reduce one of the principal determinants of the size of
the award. This article will deal with ati:empts to get the jury to con-
sider the effects of income taxes for the purpose of influencing the
jury's determination of the amount of damages and the question of
whether a jury may be told by counsel or instruction that any award
rendered will be non-taxable to the recipient.
In this country the majority view is t'hat in computing damages for
accrued loss of earnings or for impairment of future earning capacity
because of personal injuries, income tax consequences may not be
taken into consideration. Any award based on the gross earnings or
earning capacity of the plaintiff will not be reduced because of any
tax saving occasioned by injury or death.8
The principal reasons in the majority of states why juries will not
6 Loss of estate is that amount which decedent might have earned had he lived.
Loss to estate represents recovery for "savings" that decedent might have accumulated
had it not been for his. untimely death. McCormick states that different courts adopt
different tests for loss to estate. (1) The present worth of probable net earnings over
the lifetime, that is, gross earnings less individual living expenses; or (2) The present
worth of savings over the lifetime; or (3) Aggregate gross earnings. See MCCORMICK,
op. cit. supra note 5, S 96; 10 U. FLA. L. Rav. 153, 173 (1957).
7 The word "earnings" is certainly a very equivocal word in a personal injury
or wrongful death suit. Courts are hopelessly lost on whether "earnings" means
"gross" income before any deductions or taxes at all, "adjusted gross income," taxable
income after deductions but before taxes, or "net income after taxes" (take-home pay).
Cf. Annot., Propriety of Taking Income Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages on
Personal l7jury or Death Action, 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959); 16 NAACA L.J. 212
(1955); Jolowicz, Damages and Income Tax, 17 CAMB. L.J. 86 (1959).
8 For a summary of state cases, see Annot. supra note 7. Cf. Spencer v. Martin &
Eby Const. Co., 350 P.2d 18 (1960). The best article on the subject contains important
citations of state decisions. See Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards,
19 OHIo L.J. 212, n. 3 at 213 (1958). Apparently the federal courts are split. For a
collection of cases and articles see the opinion in Meehan v. Central R. Co., 181 F.
Supp. 594, 614 (2d Cir. 1960).
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be permitted to consider evidence of the income tax effect on future
earnings in an injury or death suit are the following:
(1) Payment of income taxes is a matter between the plaintiff and his govern-
ment and not a relevant concern of the wrongdoers; 9
(2) Evidence, argument, or instruction on taxes is unnecessary; 10
(3) Evidence, argument, or instruction relating to taxes would be too con-
jectural or speculative."
In most instances the determination of the present worth of the loss
of future earnings has been the setting for attempts to bring forth the
consequential effect of income taxes. No real attempt has been made
by the courts to distinguish the propriety of direct evidence from the
propriety of cross examination, or of either from that of argument of
counsel before the jury, or any of these from the propriety of an in-
struction that a jury may consider in their damage determination
those tax amounts that plaintiff, or his decedent, would have owed on
the "lost" earnings.
Note that past income tax returns are of course admissible to show
what the plaintiff or his decedent earned before the injury or death
(gross, adjusted gross, or net income) as tending to show what he
might have earned in the future. But no evidence, argument, or in-
struction, in the majority of states, is permissible to show what taxes
might have had to been paid in the future, or that past earnings are
0 This was the view taken in the Illinois case of Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.,
5 I11. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). Jurisdictions have sometimes said that to account
for taxes would violate established precedent. This contention received the treatment
it deserved in Professor Nordstrom's article, supra note 8. The emphasis on the
wrongdoer's escape of liability to high-bracket plaintiffs, were the policy otherwise,
is a penal reason most often associated with a vested interest. See 16 NAACA L.J.
212-17 (1955).
10 This could occur in a setting where defendant (1) attempted to put a tax expert
on the stand to explain influence of future taxes, or (2) tried to argue tax policy,
or (3) sought an instruction on taxes. Plaintiff has on occasion sought to qualify an
expert to go behind and explain the unreality of past tax returns showing gross
earnings for tax purposes (which a jury considers in estimating loss of prospec-
tive earnings or earning power). See Schnedl v. Rich, 137 So. 2d 1 (Fla. App. 1962).
In this Florida wrongful death action involving a plane crash, the trial judge excluded
proferred testimony of an income tax expert with reference to the interpretation of
income tax returns of plaintiff's decedent. On appeal the court said that the tax returns
spoke for themselves and were presumably within the comprehension of the ordinary
juror.
11 The feeling is that tax rates, exemptions, and permissive deductions are subject
to change and that calculations or prophecies could not be made of the effect of future
taxes on future earnings without speculation. Also because of the fixed rule of single-
ness of recovery, were tax rates later reduced, plaintiff could not return to the court
and ask for an offsetting increase in damages.
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"unrealistic" in determining future earnings because of saving not now
or then available but available in future taxable years.12
The attitude of most of these courts is that the jury must estimate
what plaintiff or decedent lost by way of his ability to earn in the
future, what he could have or would have earned or saved,'3 or some
combination of these, but that in determining these amounts, tax con-
sequences have no place, in evidence, argument, or instruction.
Inquiries at a trial into the incidents of taxation in damage suits of the
character we have here would open up broad and new matters not pertinent
to the issues involved. Such subject matter would involve intricate instructions
on tax and non-tax liabilities with all the regulations pertinent thereto. No
court could, with any certainty, properly in;truct a jury without a tax expert
at its side.14
The fear that a personal injury suit will become a trial by tax experts
is real and courts are understandably reluctant to permit direct testi-
mony. The reasons are not unlike those for which some courts will
not allow a suit for negligence based sclely on a claim for emotional
suffering. These courts will not distinguish alternative methods of in-
jecting the tax consequences sought by i:he defense counsels.
Yet academically speaking, an instruction that jury may or should
deduct estimated future taxes from any award would seem no more
speculative than the other imponderables presented to the jury in an
injury or death case. These include future pain and suffering, the
work-life span of the plaintiff, future accumulations, future savings,
future contributions to the family, and ultimate gifts to the widow
upon death in normal but due course? 5
In England it was once the rule that the taxability of future earn-
12 For instance when used in determining future earnings based on past earnings
before taxes but after expenses, the past income t.x returns of a plaintiff self-employed
in the construction business might show a five-year average income of $50,000 per
year, which would have been $150,000 but for annual depreciation write-offs of
$100,000 per year as permitted and encouraged by Section 167 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Can plaintiff introduce evidence o:r witnesses, or argue that since these
depreciation amounts will not be future expenses, his past returns are unrealistic?
13 Supra note 6.
14 Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 505, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956), taken from
Professor Nordstrom's article, supra note 8, at 224.
15 In the future tax rates could rise, fall, or remain the same. However it would
seem no more unfair to assume that the tax rate payable on future earnings would
have remained the same than to assume that they would have gone up. Plaintiffs
have a good deal more success in law trials with charts and chatter about the shrink-
ing purchasing power of the dollar than defendants have had with tax tables based on
an assumption that tax rates would remain precisely the same.
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ings, reduced to present value for award purposes, was not a matter
for the consideration of the jury in personal injury actions. 16 The
Gourley decision17 changed matters. Lord Goddard, speaking for the
majority, held that income tax consequences must be considered in
fixing damages for loss of earnings, or impaired earning capacity, 8 for
had plaintiff not been injured, but had earned the amounts represented
by such award, these earnings would have been subject to taxes. The
court therefore allowed income tax consequences to affect the amount
of the award for earning loss, past 19 and future.
In this country sporadic authority follows the English practice.2 °
It would be difficult to conceive of a more unjust, unrealistic, or unfair rule
than one which would lead a jury to base their allowance of reasonable com-
pensation for the destruction of earning capacity on the hypothesis that no
income taxes would be paid on net earnings. For all practical purposes the only
usable earnings are net earnings after payment of such taxes.21
DAMAGES AND WRONGFUL DEATH
The conceptual injustice of computing the present value of the loss
of future earnings without reference to income taxes22 that would have
been owing is heightened or aggravated in the wrongful death action.
Typically, the statutory representative recovers expected earnings
over a normal work-life span, had decedent lived, plus, in a number
of states, "savings" that the deceased might have accumulated and
left by way of dower or estate to the widow. 2 A representative state-
16 Bellingham v. Hughes, I K.B. 643 (C.A. 1949). See Comment, Evidence or In-
structions Concerning Taxes in Personal Injury Actions, 8 Sw. L.J. 97, 100 (1954).
'7 British Transport Comm. v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185, 3 All. E.R. 796, overruling
Bellingham v. Hughes, supra note 16. See 69 HARv. L. REv. 1495-97 (1955).
1s See supra note 7. The English reason that loss of earnings means of probable net
earnings in the ordinary sense of the word. See 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 156 (1953).
19 Past earnings represent amounts that could been earned from date of injury to
trial. Determining "net income after taxes" would of course be easier for past earnings
than for future or prospective earnings.
20 Floyd v. Fruit Industries, 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957) (wrongful death);
Meehan v. Central R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (wrongful death in N.J.);
O'Connor v. U.S., 269 F.2d 578, 583 (2d Cir. 1959); but see Jennings v. U.S., 178
F. Supp. 516, 532 (D.C.M.D. 1959); Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co., 200 F. Supp. 183
(D.Conn. 1961).
21 Floyd v. Fruit Industries, supra note 19. In this wrongful death action the average
income of a cotton broker for five years preceding his death was in excess of $50,000.
In one of those years his federal income tax was $35,000.
22 Cf. rejection of the "net pecuniary loss theory." See 14 NAACA L.J. 409 (1954);
8 Amu. L. REv. 174 (1954); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 25.16 (1956).
23 See supra note 6.
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ment of what a jury may consider as damages in such an action would
read as follows: 24
The jury may properly take into consideration her loss of the comfort,
protection and society of the husband in the light of all the evidence in the
case relating to the character, habits and conduct of the husband as husband,
and to the marital relations between the paries at the time of and prior to his
death; and they may also consider his services in assisting her in the care of
the family, if any, but the widow is not entitled to recover for her mental
anxiety or distress over the death of her husband, nor for his mental or
physical suffering from the result of the injury. She is also entitled to recover
reasonable compensation for the loss of support which her husband was legally
bound to give her, based upon his probable future earnings and other acquisi-
tions, and the station or condition in society which he would probably have
occupied according to his past history in that respect, and his reasonable
expectations in the future; his earnings and acquisitions to be estimated upon
the basis of the deceased's age, health, business capacity, habits, experience,
energy, and his present and future prospects for business success at the time of
his death. All these elements are to be based upon the probable joint lives of
herself and husband. She is also entitled to compensation for the loss of what-
ever she might reasonably have expected to receive in the way of dower or
legacies from her husband's estate, in case her life expectancy be greater than
his. The sum total of all these elements to be reduced to a money value, and its
present worth to be given as damages .... Within these limits the jury exer-
cises a reasonable discretion as to the amount to be awarded, based upon the
facts in evidence and the knowledge and experience possessed by them in
matters of common knowledge and information.
Thus, damages in a wrongful death action are inherently "uncer-
tain," "conjectural," and "speculative." As one court put it: "There
can be no fixed formula or mathematical certainty with reference to
many items which should be considered. by a jury in assessing damages
in a case of this kind. ' 25
In the majority of states there is no ceiling limit to recovery for
wrongful death.26 Yet in determining what the widow or representa-
tive should be awarded for lost estate or earnings should not the off-
setting factor of probable income tax be considered? There is no rea-
son why a court could not accept evidence of a mean or representative
2 4 Florida Cent, & P.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 76, 25 So. 338, 348 (1899).
25 Frazier v. Ewell Engineering & Contracting Co., 62 So. 2d 51, 54 (Fla. 1952), ap-
proved in U.S. v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S.A., 224 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1955).
26 3 BELL[, MODERN TRIALS 2392 (1954). Chapman states that as of 1961 only thirteen
states besides Illinois have monetary limits to wrongful death recovery. Among other
things he cites monthly averages of the shrinking purchasing power of a dollar as
proof that the Illinois limit is "unrealistic." Chapman, Should Compensation in Wrong-
ful Death Actions Be Limited? 50 ILL. B.J. 782 (1962).
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tax rate.2 It does not seem too conjectural, uncertain, speculative, or
irrelevant for the judge to take judicial notice of an average, or to
admit evidence of payment that a deceased would have been required
to make, with a precautionary instruction to the jury in the light of
possible changes in exemptions, dependents, and other factors that
might not be susceptible of exactitude. In a given case involving a
decedent who had been in a high tax bracket prior to his death, an in-
struction might be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.28 The
authorities today make no distinction between earnings before tax in
a death action and the analogous computation in an ordinary personal
injury suit.29 In this, an age of escalation, the wrongful death suit is
marked by double standards."° The jury is permitted great latitude
in determining damages which are uncertain and incapable of mathe-
matical exactitude, but for nearly the same reason savings based on
taxes that probably would have been paid by the decedent are abso-
lutely excluded from direct evidence, argument, or disinterested in-
struction.a1
27 This could be done in much the same way as a court takes notice of accepted
mortality tables concerning the probable duration of decedent's life span though
there is no direct evidence on whether the deceased person could have lived for a
shorter or a longer period but for the wrongful death.
28 This was the position taken by the court in the case of Montellier v. U.S., 315
F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963). Here in a wrongful death suit under the Tort Claims Act the
court said that the trial judge was not in error in making no deduction, but would
not have erred had he deducted from decedent's projected income the tax that decedent
probably would have had to pay.
29 For a criticism of the failure to distinguish "earnings" in the two actions, see
Symposium on Damages for Personal Injury, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 155, 157 (1958).
30 See the opinion of the late Judge Frank in one of the earliest cases involving an
attempt to introduce evidence of the amount ,of taxes that an individual would have
had to pay but for the permanent injury. In an affirmation of one sentence he said:
"We see no error in the refusal to make a deduction for income taxes in the estimate
of expected earnings; such deductions are too conjectural." Stokes v. U.S., 144 F.2d
82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944). Cf. Symposium, supra note 29, at 214. Contrast the above opinion
with another of Judge Frank, from a Florida wrongful death action: "But even aside
from that error, we think that the court below erred in not permitting the case to
go to the jury. The Florida cases have not laid down any strict group of criteria against
which to measure the damages to the estate. Proof of earnings is a factor to be taken
into consideration on a determination of the value of the estate the decedent would
have accumulated. But it is not an indispensible factor. [Citing a case allowing recovery
for savings though none were shown and decedent had earned nothing for the four
years prior to her death.] The evidence as to the health, habits, and industry of the
decedent was sufficient to permit the jury to make a determination. It was error to
dismiss the complaint." Herzig v. Swift, 146 F.2d 444, 446 (2d Cir. 1945).
31 On occasion, tax consequences of prospective earnings have been used to test
whether an award for lost earnings was "excessive." Cf. Annot., Propriety of Taking
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INSTRUCTIONS TO DISREGARD TAX CONSEQUENCES
The point has been made that the wall between tax and damage
computation is not entirely justified on grounds that tax rates or in-
cidents would be too speculative, particularly so in death actions.
Now, while no real attempt has been made to explore appropriate
avenues for expression of what ought to be a relevant item of damage
computation, or to distinguish the feasiblity of direct evidence, from
argument or instruction, let it be assumed that all evidence of tax
savings should be totally excluded from the damage computation as a
necessary deterrent to "trial complexity." Would telling this to the
jury in the following instruction be appropriate?
You are instructed as a matter of law that any award made to the plaintiff in
this case is not income to the plaintiff within the meaning of the federal income
tax law. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages. You are to follow the
instruction already given by this court in measuring these damages, and in
no event should you either add to or subtract from that award on account of
federal income taves.3 2
Note several distinguishing features of this kind of instruction:
(1) It is not an argument of counsel stating that any award would
be non-taxable. 33
(2) It does not state that the jury should, must, or may consider
taxes in determining what this tax-exempt award should be.34
(3) It does not state merely that any award would be non-taxable.
(4) It might be argued that such an instruction tends to take the
subject of income taxes out of the case. 5
Such an instruction has received divided treatment in this country.30
Income Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages on Personal Injury or Death
Action, 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied 341 U.S. 904 (1951), aff'd on rehearing 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir.
1951); De Vito v. United Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 88 E.D.N.Y. 1951).
32 This was taken from Anderson v. United Air Lines, 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.Cal. 1960).
33 This would be improper if there were no evidence or instruction to consider tax
consequences. See Annot., supra note 31, at 1418.
34 Nor would it necessarily tend to so state unless one assumes that a jury would dis-
regard the cautionary language of the instruction.
35 This was the position taken by the court in Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339,
251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
36 The view prevailing in the majority of states is that in the very least a party is
not entitled to such instruction. Briggs v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 248 Minn. 418,
80 N.W.2d 625 (1957). Spencer v. Martin K. Ebv Construction Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350
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The majority of courts, including those of Illinois,37 Ohio,38 Kan-
sas,39 Indiana,4° Minnesota,4I and Wisconsin,42 have denied the pro-
priety of such an instruction, on the authority of Hall v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry. Co.,43 where the Illinois Supreme Court said:
We are of the opinion that the incident of taxation is not a proper factor for
a jury's consideration imparted by oral argument or written instruction. It
introduces an extraneous subject, giving rise to conjecture and speculation. 44
The leading minority decision of Dempsey v. Thompson4' had
overruled its prior decision46 in holding that such an instruction was
entirely proper.47
Present economic conditions are such that most citizens, most jurors, are not
only conscious of, but acutely sensitive to, the impact of income taxes. Under
the Federal and State income tax laws of both Arkansas and Missouri the net
income of all persons is taxable except such as is specifically exempted. Few
persons, other than those who have had special occasion to learn otherwise,
have any knowledge of the exemption involved in this case. It is reasonable to
assume the average juror would believe the award involved to be subject to
such taxes. It seems clear, therefore, that in order to avoid any harm such a
misconception could bring about, it would be competent and desirable to in-
struct the jury that an award of damages for personal injuries is not subject
P.2d 18 (1860) (following the majority view). In the Kansas case the jury asked
whether or not the damages would be taxable, and the trial court stated that the jury
was not to consider whether or not the award would be taxable. See Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Sons, Inc., 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959); Louisville
Nashville R. Co. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. App. 1958); Wagner v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955); Combs v. Chicago St. P. M.
& 0. R. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750, 756-57 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co. v. McFerrin, 279 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Maus v. New York C. &
St. L.R. Co., 73 Ohio Law Abst. 595, 128 N.E.2d 166 (1955).
37 Hall v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 5 111. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
38 Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 7 111. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).
39 Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18 (1960).
40 Highshow v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956), pet. to withdraw opin-
ion denied, 235 Ind. 509, 135 N.E.2d 251 (1956).
41 Briggs v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. 248 Minn. 418, N.W.2d 625 (1957).
42 Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d
577 (1959).
43 Supra note 37.
44 Supra note 9, at 149-51, 125 N.E.2d at 85, approved and requoted in Spencer v.
Martin K. Eby Const. Co., supra note 39.
45 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
46 Ibid.
47 Hilton v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 67Y (1950).
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to Federal or State income taxes. The instruction could be in substantially. this
form: "You are instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in
this case, if any award is made, is not subject to Federl or State income taxes,
and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of any award
made plaintiff, if any you make."
Can there be any sound reason for not so instructing the jury? We can think
of none. Surely, the plaintiff has no right to receive an enhanced award due
to a possible and, we think, probable misconception on the part of a jury that
the amount allowed by it will be reduced by income taxes. Such an instruction
would at once and for all purposes take the subject of income taxes out of the
case.
We are now convinced and hold that an instruction substantially in the
form above outlined should have been given in this case. .... 48
The highest court in Illinois disagreed:
[I]t may be conceded that the possibility of harm exists if the jury is left
uninformed on this matter; on the other hand, it is conceivable that the plaintiff
could be prejudiced if they were told of this law. In either case, however, the
possibility is speculative and conjectural, and such being the case, it is better
to instruct the jury on the proper measure of damage and then rely on the
presumption that they will properly fulfill their duty by following said
instructions.49
An instruction to a jury that any award received for personal in-
jury or death will be non-taxable and that the jury should not con-
sider taxes in fixing the amount of damages could influence the jury to
lower the award to a figure smaller tha.. the figure that they might
have given on the mistaken notion that taxes would have to be paid
on the award.50 On the other hand, it is possible that the jury will
follow the instruction of the court and exclude consideration of taxes
in making the award. Illinois and the majority of states have it both
ways. The proferred instruction is refused because:
(1) It is better to instruct the jury on the "proper" measure of damages, and
rely on the presumption that they will fulfill their duty properly by
following the given instruction,5 1 (leaving the possibility that the jury will
add an amount for taxes), and,
48 Supra note 45, at 346, 251 S.W.2d at 45.
49 Supra note 9 at 150, 125 N.E.2d at 85-86.
50 Cf. infra note 52, an arguable example of a situation where two wrongs might
make a right.
51 "Further, the jury was correctly instructed on the measure of damages, being
told specifically the elements that they should cons;ider in awarding damages. Hence,
unless it be assumed that they might not follow the instructions, there could be no pur-
pose in mentioning anything about the award no: being subject to Federal income
tax. However, by the very nature of the jury system this court cannot indulge the
presumption that juries do not follow the instructions of the courts." Supra note 9,
at 150, 125 N.E.2d at 85.
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(2) It is better not to instruct the jury on the "proper" measure of damages,
because it cannot be presumed that the jury will fulfill their duty properly
and exclude taxes from consideration in determining the award.52
Suppose that the instruction merely read, ". . . and in computing
damages you are not to take income taxes into account." This of course
would be highly suspect, for a jury might add a figure "to take care of
claimant's tax liabilities." Loss of prospective or future earnings or sav-
ings are major items of damage in personal injury actions and particu-
larly in death actions. A good case could be made for deducting from
the award of damages the taxes that the plaintiff or decedent would
have been required to pay. But the majority of courts, following the
Hall decision, exclude tax considerations from the evidence offered to
the jury because of complexity, speculation, and conjecture, but refuse
to tell as much to the jury by instructions for the same reasons.
In the final analysis these courts confuse two problems. The first is
whether evidence of tax incidence should be admitted to diminish an
award. The second problem is unrelated. It is whether a litigant is en-
titled to an instruction which adequately excludes, in the making of
the award, all consideration of taxes, pro and con. As Professor Nord-
strom puts it,5" "Once these are confused the court can then point out
how 'confused' the jury would be with this added bit of informa-
tion.' ' 4 To wit:
You are instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in this case, if
any award is made, is not subject to federal or state income taxes, and you
should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of any award made plaintiff,
if any you make.
Without such instruction the jury erroneously might add a tax con-
sideration. 55 On the other hand, knowing from the instruction that the
52 It may be conceded that the possibility of harm exists if the jury is left uninformed
on the matter; on the other hand, it is conceivable that the plaintiff could be prejudiced
if they were told of this law." Supra note 9, at 151, 125 N.E.2d at 85-6.
53 Associate Dean and Professor of Law, in the Ohio State University College of
Law, author of Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1958).
54 Supra note 53, at 231-32.
55 The Illinois Appellate Court, in the Hall case, supra note 9, which was over-
ruled, put it this way: "In reaching their decision, the jury in all likelihood will con-
sider how much of an award the plaintiff will actually get net, not an amount from
which income taxes will have to be deducted. If the jury determine that $50,000 is
the correct amount, they will presumably award that sum if they feel there will be
no income tax; on the other hand, if they believe there is to be an income tax paid
on that amount under the law, they will award a much larger sum in the hope that
after the tax has been paid, plaintiff will still be able to retain $50,000. In the circum-
stances, the jury are entitled to be reminded, or informed, of these facts." 349 Ill. App.
175, 190, 110 N.E.2d 654, 660 (1953).
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award would be non-taxable to its recipient, the jury might subtract
from the verdict, though in disregard of "the presumption that a jury
will apply the proper measure of damages."5 6 Query, which is worse?
Is it worse that a jury, in disregard of instructions and presumptions,
will reduce an award which in natural justice should have been re-
duced by taxes that would have been owed, or that the jury will com-
pound an injustice, already present because gross earnings for damage
purposes take no account of taxes, by adding still another windfall in
the erroneous belief that no exemption exists for injury awards? What
is sauce for the jury goose may be sauce for the court gander.5 It is
difficult to see how a court can "presume" that the jury wll conscien-
tiously follow a damage standard which is neutral to tax considerations,
and yet "presume" that the same jury will not follow an instruction to
this effect, unless the latter presumption is based on a surmise that
juries do not do what they are told to do. A cautionary instruction
that in a personal injury or death action any award will be non-
taxable, obviating de facto tax consideration, and that taxes ought not
be taken into account in making such an award, obviating de jure tax
consideration, is not speculative, distracting, or irrelevant. The re-
fusal to adopt such an instruction is based on simple judicial conjec-
ture.'8 It must be concluded that the majority of courts, following the
56 "It is a fair inference that if juries are allowed to speculate on whether or not
their award is subject to Federal Income Tax, as they undoubtedly do, with the prob-
able misconception on their part that the amount awarded will be so reduced, much
larger verdicts will frequently result. The injured party should not be entitled to an
additional amount for tax obligations which do not exist in fact or in law." Id. at 190,
110 N.E.2d at 660-1.
57 Adapted from an old English proverb attributed to John Ray, 1670. See A NEw
DICtIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1060 (Mencken ed. 1942).
58 In the Hall case the court reasoned that the following would or could occur if
the instructions were given: "It does not neces,;arily follow that the argument is
proper because it correctly states the law. For if the defendant's argument is proper
on the basis that it tells the jury what the law is then what objection can there be
for plaintiff's counsel to state that the expense of trial is not provided for in the instruc-
tion concerning damages, that the cost of medical witnesses is not paid by the de-
fendant, that the expense of taking depositions, as well as court reporting at the trial,
must be borne by the individual litigants, that the fees of plaintiff's attorney are not
recognized as an element, that the defendant can deduct any award that it pays from
its income and excess profits tax returns and that the amounts of awards are allowed
as expenses in providing for increasing railroad fares? This could be developed ad
infinitum, and all this is the law." Supra note 9, at .'51, 125 N.E.2d at 86. Several things
are to be noted about this argument of the court. (1) It assumes that the instruction
is proper because it correctly states the law. The instruction is proper because in
common with every cautionary instruction it tells the jury what it should not con-
sider. The law statement is necessary to do this adequately (i.e. without it a jury might
add taxes.) (2) Expenses of trial, medical witnelses, court reporting expenses and
and attorney fees are not relevant to plaintiff's damage computations but an instruc-
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Hall case, are guilty of the speculation and conjecture from which
they seek so assiduously to insulate the jury. It is hoped that those
courts which have not yet considered whether such a cautionary in-
struction is mandatory upon the request of a litigant, 9 discretionary
with the trial judge,60 or reversible error if given,01 will ponder
the separateness of the proposition that the jury take tax incidence
into account in "determining" an award based on loss of earning
power or future earnings, and the proposition that the jury ought to
be told not to consider taxation at all, by instructions drafted in a
manner calculated to so inform them.
The latter instruction should be but a minimum. The former propo-
sition is fully deserving of further study, exploration, and comment.
tion would invite a jury to consider them and add a figure. The instructions on taxes
certainly invite no additions. They demand neutrality. For the jury will realize, under
proper instructions, that claimant will not have to pay taxes on an award based on
proper standards. (3) How many courts strike an award, otherwise just, because
a portion obviously represents attorney's fees? The great variation in attorney's fees
makes an instruction concerning them most impractical. It seems that courts silently
permit such additions, perhaps with good reason. But there is no good reason why a
court, tacitly or otherwise, should permit an additional amount for taxes that will
never have to be paid. (4) That a defendant can "deduct" an award or add it to the
Railroad's base rate is irrelevant to what standards a jury should use in making the
award. An instruction to exclude taxes in determining an award is relevant to what ajury should consider as well as obviating what they in error might have considered
in making the award.
59 The point has not been settled in most states. Florida can serve as an example.
Only in 1961, after years of litigation involving these questions, did a Florida court
settle (affirmatively) the question of whether a trial judge, in his discretion, could
give instructions that the award of damages would be non-taxable, and that no con-
sideration should be given to taxes in determining the award. Poirier v. Shireman, 129
So. 2d 439 (Fla. App. 1961). See 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 126, 128 (1961). Note that most
cautionary instructions are discretionary.
0 E.g., Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App .2d 575, 298
P.2d 700 (1956); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1958);
Combs v. Chicago St. P.M. & 0. Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Mitchell
v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956). Cf. Annot., Propriety of Taking In-
come Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Action,
63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959); Anderson v. United Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
61 See Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 7 111. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).
The Wagner case was followed in the Combs case, supra note 60, but was not followed
in the Anderson case, supra note 60.
